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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (25 Apr 67) FOR OT

31 Jan 67

10 May 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group (U)

11 24-67

12 31P

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1. Forwarded as inclosure is Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group for period ending 31 January 1967. Information contained in this report should be reviewed and evaluated by CDC in accordance with paragraph 6f of AR 1-19 and by CONARC in accordance with paragraph 6c and d of AR 1-19. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.

2. Information contained in this report is provided to the Commandants of the Service Schools to insure appropriate benefits in the future from lessons learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

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18 OACSFOR

19 OT-RD-670010  
Kenneth G. Wickham

KENNETH G. WICKHAM  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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
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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP  
APO 96289

AVGE-C

8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (VCS-CSF03-65) (U)

TO: Commanding General  
II Field Force Vietnam Artillery  
ATTN: AVFB-FA-C  
APO 96277

Commanding General  
United States Army Vietnam  
ATTN: AVG-DI  
APO 96307

Commander-in-Chief  
United States Army Pacific  
ATTN: GPOF-PM  
APO 96558



TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development  
Department of the Army  
Washington, D.C., 20310

SECTION I (S)

SIGNIFICANT HEADQUARTERS OR UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. (C) Administration and Personnel.

a. This headquarters remains assigned to United States Army Vietnam (USARV) and operates as a major subordinate command of USARV. The Commanding General, II Field Force Vietnam Artillery retains operational control of 23d Artillery Group.

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CORCOR-65) (U) 8 February 1967

b. Normal SI activities have been conducted during the period 1 November 1966 through 31 January 1967.

c. Personnel strength of the command on 31 January 1967 was:

UNIT	TOE AUTH			MTOE PENDING			ASSIGNED		
	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM	OFF	WO	EM
1st Bn, 23d Arty Gp	17	2	95	8	0	19	23	2	171
2nd Bn, 11th Arty*	33	4	552	0	0	0	30	4	536
2nd Bn, 13th Arty	27	3	486	14	0	96	31	3	553
6th Bn, 27th Arty**	35	4	544	7	0	74	34	4	595
2nd Bn, 32nd Arty	32	4	518	0	0	12	33	4	558
	114	17	2195	29	0	201	151	17	2415

\* All information pertinent to the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery is from 30 November 1966, the date of the arrival of the Advance Party in-country.

\*\* Includes Btry B, 6/27 Arty attached to 2d Bn, 94th Arty with 5 OFF and 132 EM

d. Critical MOS shortage. During the period 1 November 1966 through 31 January 1967 there continued to be a critical shortage of MOS 0540 (RTT Operator). There is a Group wide shortage of 50% of the trained personnel in this MOS.

e. Personnel changes during this quarter include:

GAINS:	OFF WO EM			LOSSES:	OFF WO EM		
	OFF	WO	EM		OFF	WO	EM
	24	0	920		23	2	395

f. Casualties included:

TYPE	NUMBER
Killed in Action	0
Wounded in Action	17
Missing in Action	0
Non-Battle Dead	2
Non-Battle Casualties	4

g. Awards and Decorations presented to members of this command included:

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Page 2 of 27 Pages

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AVGE-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

8 February 1967

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
3 Silver Star	0
Legion of Merit	2
Distinguished Flying Cross	2
Bronze Star (Valor)	1
Bronze Star (Merit)	10
Air Medal (Valor)	0
Air Medal (Merit)	39
Army Commendation Medal (Valor)	3
Army Commendation Medal (Merit)	21
Purple Heart	20

(ARVN AWARDS: Medal of Honor - 1, Gallantry Cross - 1)

NOTE: In addition to these awards, 73 recommendations for awards have been submitted and are pending approval by USAFV.

h. R & R program schedules include the following:

(1) The in-country R & R consisting of 3 day passes to VUNG TAU have been utilized by personnel.

(2) The out-of-country R & R included the following 5 day quotas:

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NOV</u>	<u>DEC</u>	<u>JAN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Bangkok	15	20	23	58
Tokyo	23	22	26	71
Manila	6	3	3	12
Hong Kong	19	20	20	59
Taipei	18	22	23	63
Singapore	3	3	7	13
Kuala Lumpur	0	0	0	0
Penang	6	7	8	21
Hawaii	8	26	29	63

Page 3 of 27 pages

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AVG2-C

8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RGS CSE01-65) (U)

i. Unit mail clerks pick up and deliver mail from the nearest APO. APO numbers for the units are as follows:

UNIT	APO
4th Bn, 23d Artillery Group	96289
2nd Bn, 11th Arty	
Hq Btry, A Btry, Svc Btry	96289
B Btry	96289
C Btry	96289
2nd Bn, 13th Arty	96289
6th Bn, 27th Arty	
Hq Btry, C Btry	96289
A Btry	96370
B Btry	96269
Svc Btry	96491
2nd Bn, 32nd Arty	
Hq Btry, A Btry, Svc Btry	96353
B Btry	96289
C Btry	96256

j. Judicial and Non-Judicial action by units included:

UNIT	ARTICLE 15	SUMMARY COURT	SPECIAL COURT	GENERAL COURT
4th Bn, 23d Arty Gp	9	1	1	0
2nd Bn, 11th Arty	12	0	1	0
2nd Bn, 13th Arty	29	4	2	1
6th Bn, 27th Arty	34	0	2	1
2nd Bn, 32nd Arty	31	4	0	0
TOTAL	115	9	6	2

k. Each Battalion and Headquarters Battery, 23d Artillery Group, operates a medical section. Pertinent statistics include:

Total patient visits (unit personnel)	2747
Admitted to hospital	33
Evacuated within the country	6
Evacuated out of country	2
Malaria cases	0



# CONFIDENTIAL

Page 4 of 27 Pages

4

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AVGE-C

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

5 February 1967

## 1. Reportable accidents included:

5

UNIT	VEHICLE	AIRCRAFT	PERSONNEL
1st Bn, 23d Arty Gp	2	2	3
2nd Bn, 11th Arty	3	0	1
2nd Bn, 13th Arty	4	0	0
6th Bn, 27th Arty	1	0	1
2nd Bn, 32nd Arty	5	0	0

m. Personnel management within the Group continues to operate smoothly. The personnel sections of the four presently assigned battalions are consolidated into the Group Personnel Section. This Section continues to be particularly effective in processing replacements and returnees.

n. The morale of the command continues to be outstanding.

o. Educational opportunities for personnel are provided by USAF extension courses.

p. Religious Services, both Protestant and Catholic, are held on a weekly basis. The Assistant Group Chaplain (Catholic) rotated on 15 December 1966 and has not been replaced. This could have created a problem for that particular religious denomination, but the policy of utilizing the Protestant and Catholic Chaplains of the 23d Artillery Group, the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, 196th Light Infantry Brigade, and the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division, on an area coverage basis, under the supervision of the II Field Force Vietnam Chaplain, has minimized this problem. A chaplain is scheduled to visit each battery within Group at least once a week for the purpose of conducting counselling sessions. Other significant activities included the following:

(1) On 22 December 1966, the Reverend Doctor Billy Graham conducted services at Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, LONG BINH. Personnel of this Headquarters were afforded the opportunity to attend this service. Transportation was arranged and the men ferried by helicopters from the 11th Aviation Battalion, PHU LOI.

(2) On 24 December 1966, His Eminence, Francis Cardinal Spellman, Military Ordinariate of Roman Catholic Military Personnel, conducted a Special Mass at Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam, LONG BINH. Transportation was arranged through the 11th Aviation Battalion, PHU LOI.

(3) On 3 November 1966, there was a groundbreaking ceremony for the new Artillery Chapel for the PHU LOI complex. This ceremony was attended by the Commanding Officer, 23d Artillery Group, Commanding Officer, 1st Infantry Division Artillery and the 1st Infantry Division Chaplain. On 24 December 1966 the Chapel was dedicated with appropriate ceremony attended by the aforementioned dignitaries.

Page 5 of 27 Pages

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5

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(4) Special Christmas Services were conducted in the Artillery Chapel on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day. During each service, the chapel was filled to capacity.

(5) The following religious dignitaries visited the 23d Artillery Group during this reporting period; these visitors all came to the Group particularly to see the Gadsden Refugee Village (see para 7 below).

(a) On 4 January 1967, the Chaplain (Colonel) Holland Hope, II Field Force Vietnam Chaplain, visited Group Headquarters and GADSDEN VILLAGE.

(b) On 6 January 1967, the Reverend Doctor Ruben K. Youngdahl on a Special Tour of Vietnam visiting all Lutheran Chaplains for the Lutheran Church of America, visited the Group Chaplain and was conducted on a tour of Group Headquarters and GADSDEN VILLAGE.

(c) On 24 January 1967, the Reverend Bishop Smith, Bishop of the Methodist Church and Chairman of the Methodist Chaplain Commission, was conducted on a tour of Group Headquarters, GADSDEN VILLAGE and other refugee villages in the PHU LOI-PHU CUONG area.

g. Medical Section Activities included the following:

(1) The Chaplains, Surgeons, and Commanders of the Group, have used their combined offices to insure that the best and most current information on personal hygiene, prophylactic usage, and frequent lectures on venereal disease are given. As a result, the Venereal Disease rate for the entire command registers at less than 2% of the average present for duty strength during the reporting period. In past reporting periods it has been noted that the percentage increased as the duration and frequency of field operations increased. This has not been true during the present reporting period, even though there has been a definite increase in days spent in field operations by units of this command.

(2) On 11 December 1966, the SERGEANT JAMES E. BOWERS DISPENSARY at GADSDEN VILLAGE was dedicated by Brigadier General Richard J. Soitz, Chief of Staff, United States Army Vietnam. The dispensary was named for Sergeant James E. Bowers, the construction foreman of the GADSDEN VILLAGE project, who was killed in an ambush on 18 August 1966. (Other Dignitaries who attended were: Major General Charles W. Eifler, Commanding General, 1st Logistical Command; Brigadier General Thuan, Commanding General, 5th ARVN Division; Mr. John Stienbeck, Nobel Prize winning author; Lieutenant Colonel Ly Tong Ba, Province Chief, BINH DUONG Province; and Captain Phuc, District Chief, PHU CUONG District. The dispensary is staffed by a registered midwife trained at the Province hospital and paid by the District Chief. Sick call is held each Monday, Wednesday and Friday by the Medical Officers from the 23d Artillery Group. An average of 35 patients were treated during each sick call.

(a) The furniture for the dispensary was constructed by local Vietnamese carpenters, under the supervision of the Medical Section of

Page 6 of 27 Pages

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6

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8 February 1967

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7 Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, and with materials obtained from scrap lumber. The furniture was styled after that constructed for the dispensary of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2d Artillery Group. Expensive pieces for obstetrical tables, treatment tables, incubators for new-born infants and medicinal cabinets to aid in the treatment of the sick, were superbly duplicated by these local Vietnamese carpenters.

(b) Through the combined efforts of the medical sections of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery; 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery; and Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, a filing system for each patient has been initiated. Since 11 December 1966, charts are being maintained on 229 patients, many with multiple re-visits. The data is compiled in both Vietnamese and English. This is the initial step in the long term follow-up and treatment history cards for GADSDEN VILLAGE.

(c) The Medical Staff of the 23d Artillery Group states that the villagers are accepting medical care as it should be, rather than as the curiosity they thought it to be initially. It is hoped that their experience with good medical treatment and the use of the model dispensary at GADSDEN VILLAGE will serve as an example for other areas to follow and to improve the medical, sanitary and health standards in this area of Vietnam.

(3) MEDCAP'S conducted by the Medical Officers of the 23d Artillery Group continue to be a major civic action project. A total of 25 MEDCAP sick calls were held in locations throughout the III Corps Tactical Zone, with a total of 465 patients being treated. This total does not include the patients treated at the SERGEANT BOWERS DISPENSARY at GADSDEN VILLAGE. (NOTE: For further information on the GADSDEN VILLAGE civic action project, see Paragraph 7.)

r. The command emphasis placed on proper administration in accordance with applicable AR's and USAFV regulations in areas of funds, messes, files, security of classified and crypto material, fire prevention and safety, etc, during the previous quarters, served to prepare the Group for its Annual General Inspection. On 21-22 November the United States Army Vietnam Inspector General conducted an Annual General Inspection of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 23d Artillery Group. The Inspector General team found many inspectional areas worthy of complimentary remarks. Brigadier General Richard J. Seitz, Chief of Staff, United States Army Vietnam, in a Letter of Commendation, dated 11 December 1966, complimented the 23d Artillery Group on its status as revealed by the inspection.

s. On 11 December 1966, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group, celebrated its first anniversary of deployment to PHU LOI, Vietnam. On that day special celebrations were planned with the theme being one year of successful accomplishment of its tactical mission, of a vigorous implementation of an outstanding civic action program, and of the enviable improvement of its Battery Headquarters area through a concerted self-help program. During an award ceremony the following presentations were made:

Page 7 of 27 Pages

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9

c. Periodic intelligence information on enemy units and installations take anywhere from 24 hours up to ten (10) days to reach this headquarters through normal G-2/S-2 channels. This delay proved unacceptable. To insure timely information for aerial observers and firing units for targeting, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group established a rapid two-way channel for intelligence information. Each unit down to battery-size acquires all intelligence information it can and transmits it to its next higher headquarters on a daily basis. All data is consolidated by the S-2 Section at Group Headquarters and the total resume is disseminated to each subordinate unit and other interested agencies. This procedure is proving highly effective. Information is acted upon promptly by aerial observers and has resulted in effective targeting.

d. The following administrative actions have been accomplished during the reporting period:

- (1) Validation of clearances:
  - (a) Top Secret 3
  - (b) Secret 49
- (2) Clearances Granted:
  - (a) Interim Secret 10
  - (b) Confidential 127
- (3) Cryptographic Access:
  - (a) Secret 8
  - (b) Confidential 4
- (4) Local file checks completed: 98

### 3. (S) Training and Organization.

a. During the reporting period, on the job training and individual cross training continued in all sections and units of the 23d Artillery Group. The operational problems due to the high percentage of personnel rotating during October and November were minimized very quickly by a detailed replacement orientation and training schedule for incoming personnel.

b. The following directives were published during this reporting period to assure uniformity within the Group:

(1) On 29 November 1966, this headquarters published a letter, Subject: Operational Reports-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65). The purpose of this letter is to provide guidance to insure that the Operational Report-Lessons Learned from each battalion follows a standard format. Two important points were stressed: (a) That it is important that the report show what action the commander initiating the report has taken to solve his own problems (b) That the report be prepared in sufficient detail to make it a meaningful document when the narrative, observations and recommendations are examined by a higher headquarters, remembering that personnel detached from the unit's

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Page 9 of 27 Pages

9



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8 February 1967

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particular sphere of influence are not necessarily as conversant with all the details of any particular state ment in the report as the unit itself might be.

10

(2) On 28 December 1966, Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group published Regulation L-300, Monthly Command Inspection. This regulation prescribes the policies, responsibilities and guidance for the conduction of command inspection of subordinate units to insure the maintenance of the highest standards of readiness in all phases of the unit's operations, and the assurance of the continuous ability of that unit to perform its assigned mission. On 29 December 1966, the following Monthly Command Inspection schedule for January-February 1967 was published:

- (a) 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery - 20 January 1967
- (b) 2nd Battalion, 32nd Artillery - 10 February 1967
- (c) 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery - 24 February 1967
- (d) 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery - TBA
- (e) Headquarters Battery, 23d Artillery Group - TBA

The inspection of the 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery conducted on 20 January proved highly beneficial in raising the material readiness and administration of that unit.

c. On 12-13 November 1966, the 23d Artillery Group provided two days of instruction on Airmobile Artillery Movement for A Battery, 7th Battalion, 9th Artillery, 54th Artillery Group, stationed at BEAR CAT. This Battery, a 105MM towed howitzer battery, had not received instruction on airmobile operations prior to deployment to RVN and was scheduled to participate in a combat operation during which it would be transported by aircraft. The instructor was given this particular mission because of his knowledge of the subject and in particular, his experience with airmobile artillery movements which he gained as Commanding Officer, C Battery, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery for six (6) months in RVN.

d. On 11 November 1966, a Veterans Day Memorial Service was conducted in the Headquarters Battery Assembly Hall by the 23d Artillery Group Chaplain. Immediately following the service, the staff of the 23d Artillery Group conducted a briefing for all Officers and Enlisted Personnel of Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 23d Artillery Group. The purpose of this briefing was to acquaint the personnel with the operational situation in Vietnam with particular emphasis on the role of the 23d Artillery Group and its battalions within the III Corps Tactical Zone. It is intended that a similar briefing will be scheduled on a periodic basis to keep all personnel current as to the mission, accomplishments and future plans affecting the 23d Artillery Group and its assigned battalions. The next such briefing is scheduled for 9 February, which is designated a holiday as a courtesy to the Vietnamese on the first day of TET.

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Page 10 of 27 Pages

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SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (P) (S) (U)

4. (S) Operations.

a. Normal Operations, consistent with the Group mission, were conducted during the reporting period.

b. The operational capabilities of the Group Artillery Battalions are varied and are reflected in their physical participation in operations this quarter as well as their special equipping for new assignments.

(1) The 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, continues to be the most active participant in operations during the quarter, spending approximately 68 days in tactical operations and 24 days in training and defense of base camp.

(2) Presently the two heavy battalions of the 23d Artillery Group are equipped with both the M10 8-inch self-propelled howitzer and the M107 175 mm Gun. Of the six batteries of these battalions, only one is organized as a complete 175mm Gun Battery. Battery B, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery is equipped with four (4) 175mm guns for the specific purpose of providing long range artillery fires in support of the III Marine Amphibious Force from the vicinity of DONG HA (YD063551).

(3) The heavy artillery continues to conduct "Turkey Shoots" (planned displacements of either an 8-inch or 175-mm platoon to a forward firing position for less than 24 hours) in the III ARVN Corps Tactical Zone.

(a) On 12 December 1966, C Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, conducted a Turkey Shoot in the vicinity of XT99564831 with two 8-inch howitzers. Two VC Base Camps at YT12304355 and YT120405 were destroyed by artillery fire. A total of 189 rounds were fired.

(b) On 15 December 1966, C Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, conducted a Turkey Shoot vicinity of XT998540 with two 175-mm Guns and one 8-inch howitzer. A VC Base Camp, previously outside of 175-mm range, was destroyed vicinity YT304624. The 8-inch howitzer fired precision missions on critical points along a known VC MSR between XT969668 and YT026664. A total of 96 rounds were fired.

(c) On 16 January 1967, C Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, conducted a Turkey Shoot from position in area XT989479. This operation involved both US and ARVN Forces. ARVN Infantry elements provided perimeter security for C Battery during this Turkey Shoot. The purpose of this shoot was to destroy three base camp complexes vicinity of YT08203567, YT094362 and YT091365 which recent aerial observation indicated were occupied. Approximately 150 rounds of small arms fire were received by an aerial observer flying over the area the day before the operation. Results of the operation were as follows: three base camps destroyed; numerous tunnels and trenches destroyed; many huts destroyed; KIA and WIA unknown, but one VC wearing a black shirt was seen running into a bunker that was subsequently destroyed. 81 rounds of 8-inch and 73 rounds of 175-mm were fired.

c. The following deployments were effected during the reporting period:

Page 11 of 27 Pages

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8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)

(1) The Advance Party of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery, arrived in-country on 30 November 1966. On arrival at PHU LOI the Advance Party was given a staff briefing at this headquarters and moved into its staging area prepared by Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, at PHU LOI to prepare for the arrival of the main body. On 15 December 1966 the Main Body of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery, arrived at PHU LOI from VUNG TAU. All vehicles and equipment closed at PHU LOI on 21-22 December 1966. As soon as the howitzers arrived they were calibrated and placed into firing positions and fired HVI fires in an Annual Service Practice posture. The 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery, was declared operational on 270800 December 1966. The deployment of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery is as follows:

Headquarters and Headquarters Battery	PHU LOI (XT846155)
A Battery	PHU LOI (XT845158)
B Battery (Closing on 2 January 1967)	DAN TIENG (XT492480)
C Battery (Closing on 27 December 1967)	QU DAU HA (XT444240)
Service Battery	PHU LOI (XT846158)

(2) B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, was attached to the 1st Battalion, 7th Artillery, on 2 November 1966, and positioned at the BO BINH Infantry School at THU DUC. The primary mission was to support ARVN Regional Forces and Popular Forces outposts in the THU DUC sub-sector. On 1 December 1966, the mission was changed to Direct Support 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry, 1st Infantry Division, conducting OPERATION FAIRFAX, and secondary mission of providing on-call fires in support of ARVN Regional Forces and Popular Forces outposts in the area, until relieved in position by A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, on 13 December 1966. A Battery returned to PHU LOI on 4 January 1967. During this period 1,122 missions were fired for a total of 6,210 High Explosive and 94 Illumination Rounds.

(3) During the period 2-24 November 1966, A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, fired in support of OPERATION ATTLEBORO/BATTLE CREEK. From a position at CU CHI, the battery moved by night road march on 4 November 1966 to TAY NINH WEST. On 5 November the battery moved to a firing position in the vicinity of SOU DA firing missions utilizing observers from both the 1st Infantry Division and the 25th Infantry Division. On 11 November, six (6) howitzers, three (3) vehicles w/trailers, and one (1) water trailer were transported by helicopter to a field position north of NUI BA DEN. On 15 November, utilizing the "Assault Battery Concept" (i.e., a four gun battery), the unit was moved by helicopter to a second field position. During the period 15-23 November the supported unit changed from day to day. It was during this time frame, on 18 November 1966, that A Battery, fired the 100,000th round (in-country) for the 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery. Colonel Allin, Commanding Officer II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, pulled the lanyard. A Battery closed at PHU LOI on 24 November 1966.

Page 12 of 27 Pages

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AVGE-C

8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)

(4) B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery, moved by convoy from CU CHI to TAY NINH WEST on 13 December 1966, to support OPERATION ATTLEBORO/BATTLE CREEK. During this operation, B Battery, attached to the 3d Battalion, 32d Artillery, fired in support of the 25th Infantry Division and the Light Infantry Brigade. The Battery returned to PHU LOI on 24 December.

13

(5) During the period 12-26 November 1966, C Battery, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, fired in support of OPERATION ATTLEBORO/BATTLE CREEK from DAU TIENG. The battery moved to DAU TIENG by C-123 aircraft in thirteen (13) sorties. On the night of 25 November 1966, the base camp at DAU TIENG came under mortar attack by the Viet Cong. There were negative casualties in C Battery, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery. On 26 November 1966, the next to the last C-123 sortie returning the battery to PHU LOI, came under enemy fire after take off and crash-landed on the end of the DAU TIENG airfield. Thirteen (13) personnel were held for treatment or evacuated to nearby hospitals. Only four (4) men were treated for any length of time, and only one (1) evacuated to CONUS.

(6) On 6 January 1967, Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery (-), departed PHU LOI for TAY NINH WEST. The battalion (-) was attached to the 25th Infantry Division and further attached to the 196th Light Infantry Brigade. As of 31 January 1967, Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, continues its mission.

(7) Effective 6 November 1966, the 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, assumed responsibility for controlling the fires of all artillery stationed at PHU LOI base camp for direct support of the one infantry battalion engaged in operation LAI SON II, a pacification program in the villages around PHU LOI, and for the defense of the PHU LOI Base. On 5 January 1967, the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery, assumed control due to the departure of the 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, for field operations. The 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery, retained operational control until 290001 January 1967, when it departed on an operation. At this time, the 8th Battalion, 6th Artillery, 1st Infantry Division Artillery, assumed control of all artillery stationed at PHU LOI.

(8) Upon the 1st Battalion, 83rd Artillery, 54th Artillery Group, becoming operational and after the deployment of its batteries to BEAR CAT and YUON LOC, the 23d Artillery Group units positioned at those locations were redeployed as follows:

(a) On 20 December 1966, A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery, began its move from XUAN LOC (XT466088) to CU CHI (XT644146). All vehicles and equipment closed on 23 December 1966.

(b) On 27 December 1966, I Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, moved by convoy from BEAR CAT (YS171997) to a temporary position area at LAI KHE (XT765364) to participate in OPERATION CEDAR FALLS. A Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, will be deployed to QUANG LOI (XT812902) and thus provide for the first time heavy artillery coverage to the Cambodian border in that sector. At the end of the quarter, an Advance Party was in QUANG LOI preparing to receive the battery.

(9) On 8 November 1966, C Battery (-), 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery, located at TAY NINH, was attached to the 1st Infantry Division,

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SECRET

Page 13 of 27 Pages

13

**SECRET**

AVGE-C

8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RGS CSFOR-65)

and was moved to a firing position in the vicinity of SONI DA (XT345586) in support of 1st A TLEBORO/BATTLE CREEK. On 15 November 1966, the 175-mm gun platoon of C Battery, which was located at XU CHU, was deployed to SONI DA and joined its parent battery in support of OPERATION APHRODISIA, BATTLE CREEK. Upon completion of the operation, the entire C Battery (175-mm gun) returned to its base camp at TAN VI TH WEST. On 23 December 1966, C Battery, 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery, converted two of its 175-mm guns to 8-inch howitzers. This action resulted in each battery of the 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery, being composed of two 8-inch howitzers and two 175-mm guns.

(10) During OPERATION CEDAR FALLS in the IRON TRIANGLE, B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery (LAI KHE), and A Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery (LAI KHE), were deployed as an 8-inch howitzer battery and 175-mm gun battery respectively. This was accomplished by exchanging two entire gun sections for two entire howitzer sections so that B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery was a four section 8-inch howitzer battery, and A Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, was a four section 175-mm gun battery. B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery occupied firing positions vicinity XT723353 and XT659310 with a mission of Reinforcing the 1st Infantry Division Artillery. A Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, remained in position at LAI KHE, with a mission of General Support Reinforcing the 1st Infantry Division Artillery and the 25th Infantry Division Artillery, with priority of fires to the 1st Infantry Division Artillery.

(11) A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery during OPERATION CEDAR FALLS occupied a firing position vicinity TRUNG LAP (XT587215) with a mission of General Support Reinforcing the 25th Infantry Division Artillery.

d. On 6 December 1966, while Colonel Salvo Rizza, Director, Department of Gunnery, United States Army Artillery and Missile School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, was in the Republic of Vietnam as a member of a COMAFS Liaison Team, he visited 23d Artillery Group Headquarters for a staff briefing on the mission of the 23d Artillery Group and particular problem areas affecting the employment of artillery in the Republic of Vietnam. Prior to Colonel Rizza's visit, the Gunnery Department sent a 14 page questionnaire to this headquarters to be completed before the visit. The questionnaire, in five sections (Section I: Gunnery; Section II: Fire Support; Section III: Target Acquisition; Section IV: Communications; and Section V: General Information) was answered by Group Headquarters and each of its Battalions. Group Headquarters compiled all answers into one summation and presented it to Colonel Rizza on his arrival. In addition, a statistical summary was compiled for the period 1 June 1966 through 30 November 1966. The purpose of this summary was to show, by battalion and caliber of weapon, the total number of missions and rounds fired for the following type of missions: Destruction, Registrations, Calibration, Preparation, Illumination, SLAR, SPAR, Red Haze, and Adjust Fire. After the staff briefing, Colonel Rizza visited the 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery at PHU LOI; B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery, at LAI KHE (where he received a briefing on battery operations, as applicable to artillery employment in RVN) and to the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery at

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**SECRET**

Page 14 of 27 Pages

14



**SECRET**

AVOE-C

8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (AES CSFOR-65) (U)

PHUOC VINH where a fire mission was in progress.

16

e. On 19 November 1966, 23d Artillery Group participated in the II Field Force Vietnam marksmanship competition conducted at the QUANG TRUNG Training Center. A five man pistol marksmanship team and a five man rifle marksmanship team represented the 23d Artillery Group and its assigned battalions.

f. In response to a letter from the ARVN II Study Group concerning Artillery Air Mobility Requirements, the 23d Artillery Group in its letter of 24 January 1967, supplied the information based on experience regarding heli-lift operations participated on by a separate non-divisional 105-mm battalion, operating in the III ARVN Corps area:

(1) "With the use of the 'Fire Support Base' (FSB) concept, there is seldom a time when it is necessary to move by echelon to provide continuous support. There are normally other units in a nearby FSB capable of providing this support while the moving unit disengages. It is estimated that over 90% of the time, general support or other US artillery can provide support. When moving in one lift, maximum utilization of security forces and artillery fire power result. When moving by echelon in a counter-insurgency environment instead of gaining the desired mutual support, the result is two or more, less efficient, poorly equipped fire units. The firing battery, designated by TOE as a single fire unit, is not equipped to move efficiently by echelon."

(2) "A single battery is required, approximately 60% of the time, to fire in more than one direction, but seldom simultaneously. This puts a definite strain on the fire direction capabilities, but can be adequately controlled when under one FDC capable of 24 hour operation. When a battery is functioning in two separate locations, it would have the capability to fire in different directions, but to accomplish this efficiently on a twenty-four hour basis, it would have to be augmented. Each separate fire unit, regardless of the number of weapons, requires a full FDC to safely and properly generate firing data on a 24 hour basis. This has been reportedly proven in Vietnam, where undermanned FDC's have produced erroneous firing accidents. Presently our FDC's are augmented by 100% to effectively and safely control the fires of the batteries. To fire a battery separate from two locations would require a 300% augmentation to the FDC provided by TOE. The required skill levels are not available in a battery size unit for this type of augmentation."

(3) "Under the current 6400 mil concept, the battery is laid in one direction upon occupying, and the lay is ~~golden~~ changed, but is checked periodically. Howitzers are 'oriented' in appropriate directions to accomplish the assigned mission. More often than not howitzers are oriented in more than one direction. In this way, fire can be delivered quickly in either direction to begin adjustment, and the remaining weapons may be

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Page 15 of 27 Pages

15

**SECRET**

quickly reoriented to provide full battery coverage if necessary. There are occasions when each gun may be given a different direction to fire, but this occurs infrequently." (For more information concerning the response to the ARCSA II Study Group concerning aviation, see paragraph 6 d.)

g. This Headquarters was informed by the Commandant, United States Army Artillery and Missile School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma, in his letter, dated 31 August 1967, Subject: 6400 Mil Firing Chart, that it had been selected to be the headquarters for the field trial of the new 6400 Mil Range-Deflection Protractor (RDP), and the 1:50,000 meter grid sheet. At the same time the instruction note for the construction of the firing chart was received. On 12 January 1967, 25 RDP's were delivered to this headquarters. On 16 January 1967, 300 sheets of 1:50,000 meter grid sheets arrived. Distribution has been made to each assigned battalion and instructions published for a thirty (30) day trial period. A detailed report will be furnished this headquarters by each battalion NLT 25 February 1967. The 23d Artillery Group will staff all comments and recommendations and forward them the Commandant, United States Army Artillery and Missile School.

h. During this reporting period all artillery tubes in the 23d Artillery Group were calibrated and inspected by pull-over gauge. Spot calibrations are performed when a unit receives a new tube.

i. On 1 November 1966, one (1) M17 175-mm gun from A Battery, 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, and one (1) M110 8-inch howitzer from A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery, participated in the National Day Parade in SAIGON.

j. The following number of missions were fired with total amounts of ammunition listed below:

UNIT	NO OF MRS FIRED	AMMO EXPENDED			
		105M.	155MM	8"	175MM
*2nd Bn, 11th Arty	3,995	-----	20,708	----	----
**2nd Bn, 13th Arty	4,111	30,467	----	----	----
6th Bn, 27th Arty	6,234	----	----	11,302	8,164
2nd Bn, 32d Arty	9,117	----	----	10,422	10,274

\* On 29 January 1967, B Battery, 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery, fired the Battalion's 10,000th round in-country after one month in operational status.

\*\* On 18 November 1966, A Battery, 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, fired the 100,000th round for the Battalion.

#### 5. (C) Logistics

a. During the period 1 November 1966 through 31 January 1967 the general condition of supply has continued to show steady improvement.

Page 16 of 27 Pages

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
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**SECRET**

16

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVGE-C

8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

Problem areas are encountered from time to time due to changes in support facilities, but they are rapidly resolved.

17  
b. Maintenance support for this period has also continued to improve. However, the 548th Light Maintenance Company did not maintain an adequate ASL to support the 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery (155-mm towed howitzers), which arrived in-country during this period. The Logistics Command is aware of this condition and has initiated corrective action.

c. Stockage levels of repair parts for the M107 and M110 continue to improve. There still exists a lack of a float sight (M115) to replace unserviceable sights on the M107 and M110. Float sights were requested (1 per battery) on USARV Form 47R and approved for issue. However, the sights have never been received. Follow-up action has been initiated by this Headquarters on these requests.

d. In relation to the last quarter, the down time for maintenance due to equipment failure of the heavy artillery weapons (M107 and M110) has been reduced. This reduction is due in great measure to the following factors:

(1) There has been an increased availability of air transportation for moving the larger repair parts from the support maintenance units to the areas where the parts are needed. The organic aircraft of the 23d Artillery Group are still being used extensively to transport the smaller repair parts.

(2) Continued vigorous command emphasis.

(3) During this quarter the 23d Artillery Group received replacement carriages for one (1) M110 and two (2) M107's. Twelve (12) new heavy weapons carriages (M107/M110) were scheduled to be issued to the 23d Artillery Group during this period, but only the aforementioned have been received.

e. Even with the increased issue and use of commercial generators for the lighting of base camp areas, the maintenance of TOE generators continues to be a problem, but of a lesser degree than in previous quarters.

f. Repair parts are still a problem with regard to the M211 trucks. This problem is being slowly alleviated by the fact that the newer M35A2 trucks are being issued to replace the M211. The 2d Battalion, 13th Artillery, received ten (10) M35A2 (2 1/2-ton) trucks to replace the M211 during this reporting period. This battalion requires seven (7) M35A2 trucks to complete the replacement of the outdated M211's still on hand. (Reg. 6159-006, 6159-005). However, the 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery, has received none of the fourteen (14) M35A2's which have been requisitioned to replace the M211 vehicles presently on hand. (Reg 6057-002, 6057-001).

g. The supply of Class V to isolated units from ASP's remains a

Page 17 of 27 Pages

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17



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AVBE-C

8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

problem. The 1st Logistical Command is studying a request submitted by this Headquarters on 30 November 1966 for the establishment of forward ASP's for heavy artillery at some of the more isolated locations, e.g., PHUOC VINH, LAI KHE, QUAN LOI, and CU CHI.

h. USARVCOM has established a new tube and breach life criteria for all artillery weapons. The tube life for the 105mm howitzer (towed) has been changed from 20,000 EFC rounds to 7,500 EFC rounds. The tube life for the 155mm howitzer (towed) has been changed from 17,000 EFC rounds to 7,500 EFC rounds. The EFC criteria for both the 105mm and 155mm being Charge 7 = 1 and Charges 1 through 6 = .25. Needless to say this drastically reduces the length of time that these weapons will remain in action before tube replacement is required. This has a direct impact on both the maintenance and supply capability of the 23d Artillery Group. The present forecast is about one (1) 105mm howitzer M101A1 tube per month and one (1) 155mm howitzer M114A1 tube and breach mechanism per month.

1. The following problem areas are noted:

(1) The short tube life of the M107 weapons continues to be a problem. The tube and breach mechanism fatigue criteria for the 175mm gun requires a replacement about every 41 days for the tube and every three (3) to four (4) months for the breach assemblies. Sometimes however, during active operations tubes must be replaced every 10 days.

(2) Although there has been some improvement since the last quarter, the PLB and higher echelon repair parts for the M107 and M110 are not as readily available as required. The 185th Maintenance Battalion continues to maintain close control of stores available in order to minimize weapon downtime.

(3) Although there has been considerable improvement for most meteorological expendables, the following items continue to be in short supply:

## FSN

6135-635-6370  
6660-408  
6660-606-8648

## NOMENCLATURE

Battery Pack, BA-259/AM  
Lighting Unit, MI-339/M  
Chart, ML 574/UM

(4) The building and maintaining of gun beds (hardstands) at heavy artillery locations remains a problem. The gun beds presently in artillery positions are made of laterite. These have proven unsatisfactory. They require constant maintenance and deteriorate rapidly during the rainy season. The 159th Engineer Group, working with design specifications of the 23d Artillery Group, constructed a wooden gun bed at QUANG TRI as a test vehicle. It was found to be satisfactory and desirable. On 20 September

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Page 18 of 27 Pages

CONFIDENTIAL !

18

# CONFIDENTIAL

WGE-C

8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

19  
1966, this Headquarters requested that similar roads be constructed at all heavy artillery positions. The 79th Engineer Group (Heavy Construction) published construction directive 79-9-66 (C), stating that materials were being procured for issuance that work was scheduled to be completed 15 December 1966. Only four (4) gun roads have been constructed to date. The four (4) constructed roads are at TAY BINH in the position of C Battery, 2nd Battalion, 32d Artillery. These are much larger in dimensions than the original specifications. This has been brought to the attention of the engineers in the dimensions have been revised to the original 36 feet by 48 feet. However, no new dates have been set for completion of this work. The need for the completion of these roads prior to the rainy season cannot be overemphasized.

(5) The movement of Class V Supply from the 3rd Ammunition Depot at LO G BINH to widely separated heavy artillery battery locations continues to tax the organic cargo vehicle assets of this Group. Convoys to the more isolated locations, i.e., HOUC VIET, LI KHU, can only be conducted once each 6 to 8 weeks and require that all available vehicles of the entire Group be utilized. These vehicles are returned to their respective battalions which then must conduct supply and ammunition resupply operations to their more accessible units. These vehicles are on the road constantly, thereby reducing the organizational maintenance time, and consequently resulting in vehicle failures and downtime.

## 6. (U) Aviation.


a. Aircraft assets remained constant during the period with six (6) OH-13's, nine (9) U-1's, and one (1) U-6 assigned to Group Headquarters and its four battalions. One (1) OH-13 is provided daily to the 5th Artillery Group as that organization was deployed without organic aircraft.

b. Aviation support requirements increased drastically during this reporting period for two reasons:

(1) The 2nd Battalion, 11th Artillery, was assigned to this Headquarters and deployed without organic aircraft. Observation for the batteries stationed at CU DAU HA (XT910240) and DAU TIEN (XT780370) had to be furnished from aircraft organic to other Group units.

(2) The redeployment of artillery units, particularly stationing of a heavy battery in TAY BINH (XT150520) and the planned deployment on 3 Feb of a heavy battery to QUA LOI (XT810900), has extended the area to be covered not only for command and control, but also for visual reconnaissance. Even though there has been an increase in the requirements for aviation, there has been no change in the equipment status of the aviation sections within the 23d Artillery Group. (Also see paragraph 2 b, above.)

(3) No additional aircraft from other Corps or Army assets have been made available to compensate for these additional missions.



# CONFIDENTIAL

Page 19 of 27 Pages

UNCLASSIFIED

AVCE-C

SU JECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-65)

8 February 1967

c. Flying time showed a steady increase during this reporting period with the total hours exceeding 1,000 hours for the first time in November. The Group Aviation Sections continued at this level of flying for the remainder of the quarter.

d. The ARCSA II Study Group in its basic letter to this Headquarters stated that the study is designed to up-date the ARCSA I study in the area of counter insurgency warfare in the light of aviation developments and experience in Vietnam during the past year and a half. In response to this statement, this Headquarters in its letter to the ARCSA II Study Group, Subject: Artillery Air Mobility Requirements, dated 24 January 1967, made the following statements which are considered pertinent for inclusion in this report:

(1) "The ARCSA I study eliminated aircraft organic to non-divisional artillery battalions and provided that each Group Headquarters would be equipped with six (6) LOH helicopters only. These aircraft would presumably meet all requirements of the group and attached battalions for target acquisition and aerial surveillance, registration and command and control. It is apparent that the manner in which artillery would be eventually deployed in Vietnam was not readily discernable to the drafters of ARCSA I. The development of brigade or larger sized base camps located strategically through out the Corps tactical zone necessitated positioning of artillery within these widely separated base camps. Provision of the proper mix of artillery at these base camps, necessitated that the firing batteries of a battalion, particularly the heavy battalions, be widely separated from each other and battalion headquarters. Therefore, based on the experience gained by this artillery group in over one year of combat in Vietnam and on the foreseeable future employment of artillery in this counter insurgency environment, it is considered that light aircraft allocations to artillery under ARCSA I are totally inadequate."

(2) "It should be understood that command and control includes the requirement to fly critically needed repair parts and supplies to widely dispersed artillery battalions and batteries across the Corps Tactical Zone. It should be further understood that the long range capability of the 175-mm gun cannot be fully exploited without immediately responsive observation aircraft in sufficient number to provide surveillance over the area encompassed by a circle forty (40) miles in diameter. The magnitude of this surveillance task becomes obvious only when recognition is given to the current deployment of the 175-mm gun units. Each of the five (5) heavy composite (8"/175-mm) batteries physically present within the 23d Artillery Group area of responsibility is based at a separate base camp. The forty (40) mile firing capability circle of each battery does not overlap that of the nearest like battery. However, the present overall coverage measures approximately eighty (80) miles from East to West and sixty (60) miles from North to South."

(3) "This group is scheduled to receive LOH helicopters for test and combat evaluation in March 1967. If the LOH meets its stated capabilities in full under current combat conditions and it is determined the LOH will replace aircraft currently assigned to the artillery, it is considered that it should be substituted for both the O-1 and OH-13's on a one-for-one basis. This would

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AVGE-C

8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (PCS CSFOR-65)

result in an allocation of 5 LOH for the Group Headquarters and 3 per battalion. The greater lift capability of the LOH over the OH-13 will probably make unnecessary the requirement for the UH-1B or U-6."

21

e. The seasonal dusty conditions have increased the maintenance problems with the O-1 aircraft. Despite changing of air filters twice daily, as recommended in this Headquarters' last Operational Report-Lessons Learned, dated 6 November 1967, the O-470 engines in the O-1 aircraft continue to fall far short of the expected engine life.

f. The following aviation missions, listed by sorties, were flown during this quarter:

	<u>Troop Carry</u>	<u>Cmd &amp; Con</u>	<u>Recon</u>	<u>FAC</u>	<u>Admin</u>	<u>Pax</u>	<u>Cgo</u>	<u>MIT</u>	<u>Hours</u>
ROTARY WING (OH-13)		802-365	981-5.5	40-21	669-243	1005	5.1		869.2
FIXED WING (O-1 and U-6)	259		877	400	911	361	16.7	50	2465.6

7. (U) Civic Action.

a. The major civic action program of the 23d Artillery Group continues to be the GADSDEN VILLAGE Project. This village is sponsored and financed by contributions from GADSDEN, ALABAMA. Materials and commodities are supplied mainly through USAID Field Representatives. Labor, furnished by the refugees who will occupy the houses, is supervised by personnel from 23d Artillery Group. Engineer support to clear land, prepare roads, build drainage ditches and dig wells, has been provided by the ARVN Engineer School, PHU CUONG, and the 5th Engineer Battalion, 5th ARVN Division, LAM SON. The utilization of all available, in-country resources, and the maintenance of close coordination with the District and Province Chiefs, coupled with the outstanding support of GADSDEN, ALABAMA, and the members of the 23d Artillery Group, have made GADSDEN VILLAGE a model civic action project.

b. At the present time fifty-eight (58) homes have been completed and occupied by refugees from the village of THUAN LOI in PHUOC LONG Province, and from the DAU TIENG District in BINH DUONG Province. Fifteen (15) additional homes are presently under construction. One (1) well has been completed in the village, with two (2) more under construction. Present plans call for two (2) additional wells in the village area. A ten (10) man defensive bunker for the security of the village has been completed and connected with the security positions of the village of PHU CUONG. The bunker is manned by a Popular Force squad of ten (10) men.

c. Planning continues for the development of a modern pig farm at GADSDEN VILLAGE. Twelve (12) small pigs, owned by the villagers, will be used initially as the nucleus of this project.

d. Construction of the school complex of three (3) buildings at GADSDEN VILLAGE, reported in the last Operational Report of this Headquarters, is planned for this calendar year. The District Chief has requested the necessary funds from the Government of Vietnam for this project.

Page 21 of 27 Pages

UNCLASSIFIED

21

8 February 1967

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
e. Other civic action projects within the 23d Artillery Group included:

- (1) The laborers and masons from the Headquarters, 23d Artillery Group Vietnamese work force, constructed a large warehouse in the camp for the refugees from the Iron Triangle evacuated as a result of SITUATION CMDAR FALLAS.
- (2) A large quantity of school and teaching supplies donated by the SWELCH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH in WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA, were presented to the Headmaster of PHUOC VINH school by the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery.
- (3) Members of the 6th battalion, 27th Artillery, have devoted time and effort to construct desks, chairs and playground equipment for the PHUOC VINH school. In addition, the Vietnamese day laborers, supervised by the Battalion personnel, maintain the classrooms in a clean condition.
- (4) Headquarters Battery and C Battery of the 6th Battalion, 27th Artillery, entertained approximately 145 children from the PHUOC VINH REFUGEE CAMP SCHOOL at a Christmas Party in their battery areas.
- (5) The 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, treated the children of TUSON VILLAGE to a Christmas Party at which over 500 pounds of Christmas gifts, donated by relatives and friends of the Battalion, were given to the children.
- (6) The Interpreter assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 13th Artillery, continues to hold English classes three times a week in the Headquarters Battery Mess Hall. An average of eight (8) Vietnamese attend the classes on a regular basis.

#### 8. (C) Communications.

- a. A new Communications Center was built during this period and is now occupied by the Communications Platoon. Operations of the Message Center, Radio Section and Wire Section, are now being conducted in an environment more conducive to efficient and secure operations.
- b. The Communications Platoon received three (3) inspections during the period of this report. Two (2) Command-type inspections were conducted: one by II Field Force Vietnam Artillery and one by the 303d Radio Research Battalion. In addition, an Annual General Inspection was conducted by the United States Army Vietnam Inspector General Team. The Crypto-facility was rated outstanding with zero deficiencies for the command inspections and Communications Platoon as a whole was rated outstanding with zero deficiencies for the USAV Annual General Inspection.
- c. A shipment of K'L-7's and K'X-10's was received from DISTRA. These cryptographic attachments now make it possible to change codes on the K'L-7's in less than one minute. Previously, a minimum of 30 minutes was required to accomplish changes in codes. The reduction of the change-over time leaves more time for transmission during periods of heavy teletype traffic.

Page 22 of 27 pages



**CONFIDENTIAL**

22

**CONFIDENTIAL**

AVGE-3

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSF R-65)

8 February 1967

23

d. The AN/GRC-46 Radio Set continues to prove less than satisfactory in this tropical environment. The transmitter T-195 continues to present the major maintenance problem. Average downtime due to non-operational, deadlined equipment for this radio set throughout the 23d Artillery Group is approximately 30%. In addition, the mean reliable range for the AN/GRC-46 is approximately fifteen (15) miles.

e. Installation of the AN/ARC-54 Radio Sets (Retrofits) was started during this reporting period. At the present time eight (8) aircraft are equipped with this new FM Radio Set. It is expected that the entire retrofitting program will be completed by the end of the reporting period. The new type FM radios on organic fixed wing aircraft of the 23d Artillery Group will allow full exploitation of the communication media, i.e., the mating of the squelch circuits of the new aircraft FM radios and the new VRC-12 series of radios.

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Page 23 of 27 Pages

23

# CONFIDENTIAL

AVF-3

3 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (ECB CSIOR -65) (U)

## SECTION II (C)

24

### PART I, OBSERVATIONS (C)

1. (U) Personnel and Administration.

NONE

2. (U) Intelligence.

NONE

3. (U) Training and Organization.

NONE

4. (U) Operations.

NONE

5. (S) Logistics.

NONE

6. (C) Aviation.

a. ITEM: Ingestion of dust reducing fixed-wing aircraft engine life.

(1) DISCUSSION: The onset of the dry-season in this area has resulted in a thick layer of fine dust, similar to talc, settling on ramp areas. Propeller and rotor **blast caused** the fine dust to be disturbed and ingested into the air induction system of the aircraft.


(2) OBSERVATION: Engines should be operated at minimum necessary RPM to reduce propeller blast and reduce ingestion of dust into the air induction system. Every effort should be made to reduce dust on ramp areas by sprinkling or soaking the area with used diesel oil, used lubrication oil or a peno-prime treatment.

b. ITEM: Fragment strikes from 8-inch howitzer rounds.

(1) DISCUSSION: Aircraft of the command flying at the normal 1500 feet altitude during adjustment of heavy artillery have received hits by fragments from 8-inch howitzer bursts.

# CONFIDENTIAL

Page 24 of 27 pages



24

**CONFIDENTIAL**

INCE-C

8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RIS CSF02-65) (U)

25 (2) OBSERVATION: When adjusting 8-inch howitzer artillery, a minimum of 500 meters slant range is required to prevent damage to the aircraft.

c. ITEM: Damage to aircraft from ground fire.

(1) DISCUSSION: During the reporting period several O-1 aircraft have been hit by ground fire, and one observer seriously wounded. Routes of descent and climb for aircraft on low level reconnaissance are of critical importance. Routes should be selected which allow descent and climb over densely wooded areas. Flight time over open areas must be held to a minimum. When flight over open areas is unavoidable, the aircraft should remain at minimum altitude until well clear of suspected enemy concentrations.

(2) OBSERVATION: Although this is not a new problem, continued emphasis must be placed on the proper selection of routes of descent and climb in order to prevent possible damage to aircraft and personnel during low level reconnaissance.

7. (U) Civic Action.

NONE

8. (U) Communications.

NONE

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Page 25 of 27 pages

25



# CONFIDENTIAL

AVOZ-C

8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS C 102-35) (U)

## SECTION II (C)

### PART II, RECOMMENDATIONS (C)

1. (U) Personnel and Administration.

NONE

2. (U) Intelligence.

NONE

3. (U) Training and Organization.

NONE

4. (U) Operations.

NONE

5. (C) Logistics.

a. The remaining twentyone (21) M211 trucks within this command be replaced immediately by the M35A2 Series.

b. The forward ASP for Class V Supply for heavy artillery be established at THUOC VINH, LAI KHI, BAN KHI and CU CHI as soon as possible.

6. (U) Aviation.

a. All non-divisional artillery battalions be authorized to deploy an organic air section of two (2) O-1 aircraft and one (1) light helicopter and artillery groups with three (3) C-1 aircraft and two (2) light helicopters.

7. Civic Action.

NONE

8. (C) Communications.

a. It is recommended that steps be taken to expedite the delivery of the new AN/GRC-142 type Single-Sideband radio to replace the AN/GRC-45 Radio Set. This replacement will eliminate most of the problems with the AN/GRC-45.

CONFIDENTIAL Page 26 of 27 pages

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26

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AVI-3

8 February 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (RCS CSFOR-45) (U)

27

b. That the retrofit of the new series FM aircraft radios be completed as soon as possible in order to exploit the full capability of the AN/VTC-46 radios.

*Thomas H. Sayes*

THOMAS H. SAYES  
Colonel, Artillery  
Commanding

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27

**SECRET**

AVFB-FAC (8 Feb 67) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

29 DA, HQ, II FFORCEV Arty, APO 96266 3 APR 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The quarterly report submitted by the 23d Artillery Group is considered adequate.

2. (S) Reference Section I, paragraph 2 b (2). The increased area for which this group is responsible both in fire support and visual aerial reconnaissance cannot be covered effectively with current aviation assets. As reported in Section I, paragraph B 4 of this headquarters' Operational Report on Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 October 1966, USARV has proposed to increase the support for the 23d Group from nine to eleven O-1 aircraft. This increased support has not yet been received. This problem of aviation support has been cited in all Operational Reports previously submitted by this headquarters.

3. (C) Reference Section I, paragraph 2 c. Since the delay in receiving INTSUM's is due to the time lag in transmitting "hard copy" reports, II FFORCEV Artillery has initiated a fragmentary INTSUM in which a summary of all important intelligence is transmitted to the group each night by priority message.

4. (C) Reference Section I, paragraph 5 i (3). The items listed as being in short supply in the basic document are now available in sufficient quantities to satisfy the needs of all Meteorological sections.

5. (C) Reference Section I, paragraph 5 i (4). Work on the required gun pads is progressing so that now nine of these pads are completed. The materials for the remaining 13 pads are available and have been released for use. Liaison and coordination with the Engineer representatives will continue as work progresses on this project.

6. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph 5 a; concur.

7. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph 5 b. As stated in Section I of the basic report, the 1st Logistical Command has been studying a request for establishment of new forward ASP's. Continued efforts by the S-4 II Field Force Artillery and G-4 II Field Force in conjunction with HQ, USARV and 1st Logistical Command will lead to an in-country solution to this problem.

8. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph 6. Strongly concur in the recommendation that artillery units be provided this minimum aviation support. See paragraph 2 above.

28

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AVFB-FAC (8 Feb 67) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report on Lessons Learned

9. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph 8 a; concur. See Section I, paragraph 8 d of basic report.

10. (C) Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph 8 b; concur. Installation of retrofit radios continues and should be completed within 30-60 days.

*W.D. Crittenger, Jr.*  
W. D. CRITTENBERGER, Jr.  
Brigadier General, USA  
Commanding

29

**SECRET**